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ECOLOGY, TRADE AND STATES IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. State capacity matters for economic growth. I test Bates’ explanation of states
in pre-colonial Africa. He argues that trade across ecological boundaries promoted states.
I find that African societies in ecologically diverse environments had more centralized
pre-colonial states. This result is robust to reverse causation, omitted heterogeneity, and
alternative interpretations of the link between diversity and states. I test mechanisms by
which trade promoted states, and find that trade supported class stratification between
rulers and ruled. My results underscore the importance of ethnic institutions and inform
our knowledge of the effects of geography and trade on institutions.
1. INTRODUCTION
States that can collect taxes, protect property, and sustain markets matter for devel-
opment. State capacity positively predicts economic growth (Rauch and Evans, 2000).
Many variables that explain cross-country income differences require a state strong
enough to provide them. These include social infrastructure (Hall and Jones, 1999), in-
stitutional quality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), and investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000).
The inability of states in poor countries to govern effectively helps explain their failure
to develop (Migdal, 1988). Weak states under-invest in public goods (Acemoglu, 2005).
It is not only modern states that matter; state antiquity predicts economic growth, po-
litical stability, and institutional quality in the present day (Bockstette et al., 2002). The
determinants of state capacity, then, are important parts of modern growth.
In this paper, I test a “Ricardian” theory of states in sub-Saharan Africa originally pre-
sented by Bates (1983). Building on earlier views,1 he argues that long-distance trade
gave rise to states in Africa. His model is verbal:
[T]he contribution of the state is to provide order and peace and thereby
to render production and exchange possible for members of society. The
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origins of the state, then, lie in the welfare gains that can be reaped through
the promotion of markets.
He suggests that gains from trade are greatest where products from one ecological zone
can be traded for products from another. It is near ecological boundaries, then, that
we should expect to see states. To support his view, he takes 34 pre-colonial African
societies, and shows that the proportion of societies with central monarchs is greater on
an ecological boundary.2
Bates’ view has been overlooked because his sample size prevents him from making a
credible econometric argument that this correlation is causal. In this paper, I use ethno-
graphic and geographic data to overcome this limitation. I merge data on state central-
ization for 440 ethnic groups in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa with a map of African
ecological zones. I use ethnic-level ecological diversity to proxy for the gains from trade.
I show that ecological diversity is strongly related to the presence of pre-colonial states.
For example, within the societies classified as “Equatorial Bantu,” the Luba score .69 on
the diversity index and 3 out of 4 on the centralization index. The Kela and Ndonko, by
contrast, have no diversity and no centralization. On the “Guinea Coast,” the Yoruba
score 3 on centralization and .58 on diversity, while the Yako score zero on both.
I show that this result is robust. I use spatial variation in rainfall to control for pos-
sible reverse causation. The result survives additional controls, checks for unobserved
heterogeneity, alternative estimation strategies, removing influential observations, and
alternative measures of trade and states. I show that the “Ricardian” view better explains
the relationship between states and diverse ecology than six alternative interpretations.
These are: first, larger territories are more diverse and require more levels of administra-
tion; second, societies that independently develop states conquer trading regions; third,
dense population in diverse regions explains statehood; fourth, defense of “islands” of
land quality accounts for states; fifth, the diversity of available economic activities cre-
ates states, and; sixth, competition between ethnic groups in more diverse areas leads to
state formation. I rule out these alternative explanations by controlling for these mech-
anisms directly, by re-estimating the results using artificial countries of a uniform shape
and size as the unit of observation, and by presenting narrative evidence from the most
influential observations in the data.
Unlike Bates, I am agnostic about whether it is long-distance or local trade that mat-
ters most to state formation, and about whether trade gives rise to states by increasing
the returns to investment in public goods, by cheapening the cost of extending author-
ity over space, or by making rulers more effective in public goods provision. The public
goods provided by states can lower the costs of both inter-state and intra-state trade.
In the appendix, I present a simple model of the mechanisms by which trade may lead
to state centralization. I find that class stratification is the channel best supported by
the data, though trade is associated with a wide range of state functions. No one type
2I present a condensed version of his results in the web appendix.
ECOLOGY, TRADE AND STATES IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA 3
of trade emerges as most important. Though I am motivated by a literature on Africa, I
show that the relationship between diversity and states holds outside of Africa as well.
These results contribute to our understanding of the importance of ethnic institu-
tions, of the origins of institutions, and of the relationship between trade and institu-
tional quality.
Institutions predating modern nation states matter. These include forms of colo-
nial rule, land tenure, and forced labor (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2010; Iyer, 2010).
In particular, “ethnic” institutions shape modern development. These are especially
important for Africa. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) show that pre-colonial
African states better explain economic activity today than several measures of national
institutions. African countries that possessed more centralized states prior to colonial
rule have greater levels of public goods provision today (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007).
The congruence of modern African states with those that preceded colonial rule bene-
fits governance today (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Englebert, 2000).
States are not the only ethnic institution that matters. Local institutions of property
rights and polygamy pass smoothly over modern borders (Bubb, 2009; Fenske, 2011a),
and affect Africans’ investment incentives (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Tertilt, 2005). So-
cial sanctions within ethnic communities help overcome collective action problems
(Glennerster et al., 2010; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). The origins of these ethnic institu-
tions have gone largely unexplored in the literature. I contribute by linking them to the
gains from trade.
Geography shapes institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Bio-
geographical features such as population density (Acemoglu et al., 2002), crop suitabil-
ity (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002), and domesticable species (Olsson and Hibbs, 2005)
have all been shown to shape the development of institutions and related outcomes.
Other geographic explanations of states point to features such as the observability of
production (Moav et al., 2011), population density (Austin, 2008; Herbst, 2000), outside
options (Allen, 1997), and natural boundaries (Jones, 2003) as causes of state capac-
ity. This literature has, however, focused overwhelmingly on institutions that exist in
the present day or those that were created in the circum-Mediterranean or in European
colonies. Less is known about the geographic origins of institutions that have not been
built by Europeans. I provide evidence on the causes of institutions indigenous to Africa.
Countries with better institutions trade more (Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Causation
runs in both directions; countries with better contract enforcement are able to special-
ize in products that require relationship-specific investments (Nunn, 2007), while trade
may directly improve institutional quality (Rodrik et al., 2004). Similarly, the impact of
trade on other outcomes such as growth and environmental management is mitigated
by institutional quality (Damania et al., 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006). The effects of trade
on institutions are not fully known. While some studies have found that trade reduces
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corruption (Dutt, 2009; Treisman, 2000) others have found either no effect or that cor-
ruption is simply displaced (Knack and Azfar, 2003; Sequeira, 2011). Similarly, the effects
of trade on democracy may be positive (Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner, 2005), negligible
(Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008) or may depend on the timing of trade reforms (Gi-
avazzi and Tabellini, 2005). In this, paper, I trace out the importance of trade for one
specific institutional outcome – the centralization of African states.
The Ricardian view is only one of many explanations of the strength of states. In addi-
tion to the geographic theories listed above, other views stress factors such the relative
benefits of “stationary” versus “roving” bandits (Olson, 1993), the relative benefits of
different mechanisms for governing markets (Dixit, 2004) inter-state competition (Gen-
naioli and Voth, 2011; Tilly, 1992), war (Besley and Persson, 2008; Prado and Dincecco,
2012), the slave trades (Nunn, 2008; Robinson, 2002; Rodney, 1972), patronage politics
(Acemoglu et al., 2011), and past investments in state capacity (Besley and Persson,
2009, 2010). It is not within the scope of this paper to test these unless they are alter-
native interpretations of the link between states and ecological diversity.
In section 2, I describe my econometric specification and sources of data. In section
3, I present the baseline results. In section 4, I demonstrate the robustness of these
results to endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, the estimation strategy, influential
observations, and alternative measures of trade and states. In section 5, I give evidence
that the six alternative stories mentioned above do not explain the results. In section
6, I present suggestive evidence that centralized states emerged from trade because it
supported class differentiation, and that no one type of trade mattered most. In section
7, I conclude.
2. DATA
To test whether the gains from trade due to ecological diversity predict the existence
of centralized states in pre-colonial Africa, I estimate the following equation on a sample
of African societies, using an ordered probit:
(1) State centralizationi = α + βGains from tradei + x
′
iγ + i.
In this section, I explain my sources of data on state centralization, my ecological
proxies for the gains from trade, and the controls that I include in xi. I cluster standard
errors by the thirteen ethnographic regions recorded in the sample.3
To measure African states, I take data from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. This
was originally published in 29 issues of Ethnology between 1962 and 1980. It contains
3These are: African Hunters, South African Bantu, Central Bantu, Northeast Bantu, Equatorial Bantu,
Guinea Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Eastern Sudan, Upper Nile, Ethiopia/Horn, Moslem Su-
dan, and Indian Ocean.
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data on 1267 societies from around the world.4 From this source, I use variable 33, “Ju-
risdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community” to measure state centralization. This
gives a discrete categorization between “No Levels” and “Four Levels.” The sample used
for the analysis consists of the 440 sub-Saharan societies for which this variable is not
missing.5 For comparison with Europe and Asia, the Chekiang and Japanese score a 4
on this index, the Czechs and the Dutch score a 3, while the Lolo and Lapps each have
no state centralization.
As far as I am aware, no data exist on pre-colonial African trade that could allow com-
parison of a large number of societies. I follow Bates (1983) in assuming that the ability
to trade across ecological zones creates gains from trade. I use White’s (1983) vegetation
map of Africa to identify these regions.6 This classifies African vegetation into 18 major
types, which I plot in the web appendix.7 I use three measures of the ecologically-driven
gains from trade: ecological diversity, distance from an ecological boundary, and eco-
logical polarization. In section 5, I supplement this data on ecology with a discussion of
the historical and anthropological evidence on trade and states in six African societies.8
Though Bates (1983) focuses on long distance trade, internal trade may also facilitate
states. A state may protect intra-ethnic trade, but it may also facilitate trade between
polities occupying two separate, internally homogenous regions. In section 6, I show
that the data cannot ultimately disentangle whether it is local trade or long distance
trade that matters most. Thus, I construct indices of the gains from both local and long-
distance trade.
The principal measure that I use of gains from trade is ecological diversity. I calculate
the share sti of each society i’s area that is occupied by each ecological type t. Ecological
diversity is a Herfindahl index constructed from these shares:
4In particular, I use the revised Atlas posted online by J. Patrick Gray at
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/˜drwhite/worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav.
5It is probable that stateless societies are more likely to be missing from these data. This will only bias the
results if they are more likely to be missing in ecologically diverse regions than in ecologically homoge-
neous ones.
6This is available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/data/download/gnv031.zip.
7Altimontaine, anthropic, azonal, bushland and thicket, bushland and thicket mosaic, cape shrubland,
desert, edaphic grassland mosaic, forest, forest transition and mosaic, grassland, grassy shrubland, sec-
ondary wooded grassland, semi-desert, transitional scrubland, water, woodland, woodland mosaics and
transitions.
8It is possible that gains from trade could arise from other forms of geographic heterogeneity. Empirically,
ecological diversity performs best. I have found no positive effect of other indices, such as ruggedness
or a Theil index of land quality on states. Area under water in White (1983) indicates rivers and lakes:
this has a negative impact on statehood if included with the baseline set of controls. Mangroves and
coastal areas are classified as “azonal,” and have no effect. The difference in land quality between the
most fertile and least fertile points in an ethnic group’s territory does predict states, but this is given a
different interpretation in section 5.
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(2) Ecological diversityi = 1−
t=18∑
t=1
(sti)
2.
This is intended to capture the opportunities for trade that exist within an ethnic
group’s territory – the gains from internal trade.
The second index that I use measures ecological polarization. This is also constructed
from the vegetation shares:
(3) Ecological polarizationi = 1−
t=18∑
t=1
(0.5− sti
0.5
)2
sti.
This measures the degree to which a society approximates a territory in which two
vegetation types each occupy half its area. Similar measures have been used for eth-
nicity (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b). This measure is also intended to capture
gains from internal trade. If increasing returns to scale exist in either production or
trade, this trade may be most profitable if a society is divided into if two distinct ecolog-
ical zones, which would maximize the polarization index.
The third index that I use of the gains from trade is distance from an ecological bound-
ary. I use the White (1983) map to compute the average distance (in decimal degrees)
of all points in a group’s territory from the nearest boundary between two ecological re-
gions. By contrast with the previous measures, this is intended to capture gains from
external trade, since the boundary may lie outside the ethnic group.
I present maps of state centralization and ecological diversity on Murdock’s (1959)
ethnic map of Africa in Figure 1.9 The most centralized African states are clustered
along an East-West line between the Sahara desert and West African forest zone, in the
diverse microclimates of the Ethiopian highlands, along the barrier between the equa-
torial rainforest and the East and Central African woodland mosaics, and on the divide
between grassland and woodland in the continent’s southeastern corner.
I am able to join several other geographic variables to the data on ecology and states
using the Murdock (1959) map of Africa. I include these in xi as controls. Except where
I note otherwise, I take data stored in raster format, and for each society I compute the
average value of the points within its territory.10 In particular, I control for the presence
of a major river, agricultural constraints (an inverse measure of land quality), distance
9The base map of ethnic groups is available on Nathan Nunn’s website. While most ethnic groups can be
matched to this map directly by name, some require an alternative spelling, an alternative name, linkage
to a supergroup, or subgroup, or joining to an ethnic group in roughly the same location. A table of these
matches is included in the web appendix.
10Raster data taken from the following sources: Ag. Constraints, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/
LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 28; Elevation, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/; Malaria, http://www.
mara.org.za/lite/download.htm; Precipitation, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.
html, plate 1; Temperature, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 6; Rugged-
ness, http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
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FIGURE 1. State centralization and ecological diversity
Notes: States, on the left, are from Murdock (1967). Darker regions have more centralized states. Ecolog-
ical diversity, on the right, is computed using White (1983). Darker regions are more ecologically diverse.
from the coast, elevation, suitability for malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, tempera-
ture, distance from Lake Victoria, date of observation, crop type dummies, and distance
from each of the four major slave trades. These variables are described in more detail in
the web appendix. Summary statistics are given in Table 1.
The greatest difficulty with these data are that they are anachronistic – the institu-
tional variables are recorded at an earlier date than the geographic controls and the
measure of ecological diversity. Because these variables are slow to change, this should
only add measurement error to the analysis.
3. RESULTS
I begin by showing the unconditional relationship between the ecological measure of
gains from trade and state centralization. In Figure 2, I cut the sample into two – soci-
eties above and below the median in terms of ecological diversity. For each, I show a
histogram of the relative frequencies of states of each level of centralization. Below the
median (the lighter bars), it is more common for societies to have no levels jurisdiction
above the local, or only one level. Above the median, there is a greater prevalence of
societies with two or three levels of jurisdiction. As ecological variation rises, the distri-
bution of state centralization shifts to the right.
Table 2 presents estimates of β. I report the full set of coefficient estimates in the web
appendix, omitting them here for space. In column 1, only the measure of ecological
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FIGURE 2. State centralization above and below median diversity
The dark bars are for ecological diversity above the median, the light bars for ecological diversity below
it.
diversity is included. Ecological diversity has a significant and positive correlation with
state centralization. This is robust to the inclusion of additional controls in column 2.
Few of the additional controls are significant. The exceptions are date of observa-
tion (negative), no major crop (negative), roots and tubers (positive), and major river
(positive). The negative effect of the date of observation suggests that colonial anthro-
pologists chose to first study the most centralized African societies – the low hanging
academic fruit. The negative effect of no major crop suggests that it is difficult to form a
state without an agrarian base. The positive effect of roots and tubers is likely capturing
unobservable features of forest-zone Bantu societies that better enabled them to create
states. Major rivers are associated with trade, and further support the Ricardian view of
African states. Results are similar if the length of river per unit area is used, rather than
a dummy (not reported).
Is the effect of ecological diversity large? In Table 2, I report the marginal effects of
ecological diversity. The marginal effect of a one unit change in ecological diversity is to
reduce the probability of having no levels of jurisdiction above the local by roughly 22-26
percentage points. The probabilities of having two or three levels increase to match this.
Ecological diversity has a bimodal distribution with peaks at zero and roughly 0.5 (see
the web appendix). Were a society to be taken from an ecologically homogenous region
and placed in one that was typically diverse, the probability of any centralization would
rise between 11 and 13 percentage points. If the ecological diversity measure is replaced
with an indicator for being above median diversity, mirroring this thought experiment,
the marginal effects (also reported in Table 2) are between 9 and 11 percentage points.
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The pseudo-R2 statistics reported in Table 2, by contrast, are low. While the effect of
diversity is sizable, the controls here cannot explain more than 10% of the variation in
African states. The estimation without controls correctly predicts the level of central-
ization for 42% of the sample, barely an improvement over selecting the mode. Adding
controls raises this to only 45%.
4. ROBUSTNESS
4.1. Validity of the state centralizationmeasure. The measure of state centralization I
use is not ideal. Weak but pyramidal states such as the Bemba will appear centralized.
I would like to replicate these results with alternative measures of state strength. I am
not, however, aware of any similar measure available for more than a small sub-sample
of the ethnic groups in my data. Instead, I take two other approaches to validate the
state centralization measure.
First, I show that it is strongly correlated with other measures of states for which I
have data in other samples. Bockstette et al. (2002) and Chanda and Putterman (2007)
report an index of “state antiquity” that measures historical state strength at fifty year
intervals for modern-day countries. I take this measure for the period 1850-1900 as a
measure of state strength just prior to colonial rule. The state centralization index has
been aggregated to the country level by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). For 41 countries, I
have both measures. Regressing nineteenth century states on country-level centraliza-
tion and a constant gives a coefficient estimate of 15.096 and a standard error of 4.970 –
the two are strongly correlated.
Similarly, the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS) is a sub-sample of 186 societies
recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas for which much larger number of variables are avail-
able. I have not used these in the present study, since only 28 societies in the SCCS
are from sub-Saharan Africa. I can, however, show that the centralization measure is
strongly correlated with the other measures of states.11 For nearly thirty variables from
the SCCS that capture ordinal measures of various aspects of state strength, I regress the
variable on my measure of state centralization (see the web appendix). All of these are
significantly correlated with state centralization, whether they measure the existence of
a police force, the presence of taxation, or the capacity of states to enforce their decrees.
The measure used in this study, then, is a valid proxy for state strength.
Second, I show that the main result still holds if recode the state centralization mea-
sure into a dummy that equals one if the society has any levels of jurisdiction above the
local. This may better capture state strength if, for example, it is impossible for a central
authority to delegate administrative functions to regional leaders without also losing
some control over them. I show in Table 3 that this measure is also positively related
to ecological diversity. Results are similar if I use centralization greater than one as a
binary outcome (not reported).
11The centralization measure is v237 in the SCCS.
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4.2. Validity of the gains from trade measure. While ecological variation captures to
some degree the presence of gains from trade, it is not clear that it is the best measure
available. I present results using alternative measures in Table 3. Distance from an eco-
logical boundary and ecological polarization both strongly predict states. Results using
a binary indicator for whether the society is diverse at all (equivalent to whether it is
intersected by a boundary) are similar.
Because some of the ecological types recorded in White’s map are alike, potentially
leading to over-estimation of ecological diversity, I collapse these classifications into
eight “simpler” types.12 Results are again significant. This simplification does not re-
move the bi-modal distribution of diversity. Finally, I re-build the data-set discarding
any slices of map in which historical population density is less than 15% of the density
of the ethnic group as a whole.13 These potentially irrelevant regions are not determin-
ing the results.
In addition, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has independently divided
Africa into eleven “dominant ecosystem classes.”14 I construct a new ecological diversity
index using the share of raster points within an ethnic group for each ecosystem class. I
show in Table 3 that this measure also predicts states.
4.3. Validity of the estimation. The main result is not driven by the choice of estima-
tor, by the choice of controls, by outliers, or by specific sub-samples. The main result is
robust to relaxing the “parallel regression” assumption used in the ordered probit esti-
mator. In the web appendix, I re-estimate the main results using a generalized ordered
probit model (Maddala, 1986), in which the coefficients on the latent variables can vary
across cutoff points. Excepting at four levels of centralization, for which few observa-
tions exist, the effect of diversity on states is positive throughout. Because the unit of
observation is the ethnic group, rather than the political unit, it is possible that multi-
ethnic polities will be double-counted. If I downweight all societies with centralization
greater than zero by one half or one third, the results are virtually unchanged (not re-
ported).
The inclusion of the major river dummy and distances from the coast, Lake Victoria,
and slave trade ports may be capturing elements of trade based on features other than
ecological diversity. I show in the web appendix that excluding these variables barely
affects the results. Similarly, inclusion of the date of observation is intended to control
12Mountain if altimontane, other if anthropic, water or azonal, bushland if bushland and thicket or bush-
land and thicket mosaics, shrub if cape shrubland, transitional scrubland or grassy shrubland, desert if
desert or semi-desert, grassland if grassland, secondary wooded grassland or edaphic grassland mosaics,
forest if forest or forest transitions and mosaics, and woodland if woodland or woodland mosaics and
transitions.
13I use density in 1960 as a proxy for historical population density.
14This is plate 55, downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm. The
ecosystem classes are: Undefined; Grassland; Woodland; Forest; Mosaics including crops; Cropland; In-
tensive cropland; Wetlands; Desert, bare land; Water and coastal fringes; Ice, cold desert, tundra; and
Urban agglomerates.
ECOLOGY, TRADE AND STATES IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA 11
for both remoteness and the possible impacts of European influence. Because this may
be endogenous to state centralization, I show in the web appendix that excluding it does
not change the results. Including the country-level timing of the neolithic revolution
also does not change the results (not reported).15
In the web appendix, I control for outliers by discarding influential observations. I
also drop each of the “South African bantu,” “Ethiopia/horn,” ‘Moslem sudan” and “In-
dian Ocean” in turn, as these are the regions in which most states are concentrated. It is
not outliers or any one region that is driving the results. I also show in the web appen-
dix that the results are not driven by the presence of non-agricultural societies, societies
with poor land, animal husbandry, or the desert fringe. While the main results are es-
timated using only sub-Saharan Africa, they are similar when estimated including the
whole continent (not reported).
4.4. Possible reverse causation. Strong states may shape their environment. McCann
(1999) describes, for example, the careful regulation of forest resources in Ethiopia be-
fore the twentieth century. To control for this, I use variation over space (not over time)
in rainfall to instrument for ecological diversity.16 This captures variation in ecological
conditions that is beyond human control. This will control for reverse causation. It will
only control for unobserved heterogeneity if variation in rainfall is uncorrelated with
other unobserved determinants of states.
For each society, I use the log of the rainfall range as an instrument, where:
(4) Log rainfall rangei = ln(1 + (rain
max
i − rainmini )).
Here, rainmaxi is the value of the raster point with the most precipitation for society i,
while rainmini is the value of the driest point. I take the natural log to improve fit. This
instrument cannot be computed for societies too small to have at least two raster points
for precipitation. I show that the results are robust to assigning these societies a log
rainfall range of zero and including them in the estimation.
I present the results in Table 4. I replicate the main results from Table 2 using ordinary
least squares (OLS), for comparability with the other columns. Including or excluding
societies for which there are not sufficient raster points to compute the instrument has
little effect on the estimate. I also present the instrumental variables (IV) results in Table
4. These are much larger than the OLS estimates. There are two likely reasons for this.
First, measurement error in ecological diversity is plausible, since vegetation classes are
subjective and have imprecise boundaries. Second, ecological diversity may be corre-
lated with unobservable variables that hinder states. Where ecological boundaries abut
15This data is taken from Louis Putterman’s website.
16I do not use variation over time for two reasons. First, it is unlikely to predict ecological diversity, which
is variation across space in vegetation. Second, fluctuations in rainfall over time may lead to conflict
(Miguel et al., 2004), which could directly affect state formation.
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agriculturally marginal areas such as deserts and mangrove swamps, states may have
less agricultural surplus to tax. I show below that controlling directly for the vegetation
shares increases the estimated effect of diversity on states. The reduced-form and first
stage results are also reported in Table 4.
4.5. Possible omitted heterogeneity. In Section 5, I deal with specific unobservables
that are related to alternative interpretations of the data. Here, I take seven more general
approaches, and report the results in Table 5.
First, I add area shares sti of each ecological type as additional controls. The estimated
effect of diversity is now larger, and more statistically robust.
Second, I include a cubic in latitude and longitude with full interactions. This allows
unobservables to vary smoothly across space. The results are robust to including this.
Third, I adjust for spatial autocorrelation and spatial lags. I begin with a spatial error
model. This replaces the vector of errors in (1) with a spatially-weighted vector λW,
and a vector of iid errors, u. W is a row-normalized spatial weights matrix. I select W so
that all societies whose centroids are within ten decimal degrees of each other are given
a weight inversely proportionate to their distance from each other.17 The effect of eco-
logical diversity remains statistically significant, though the estimated coefficients are
smaller. I next add the observableX of each society’s neighbors, weighted by the matrix
W . Results are similar if I use a spatial lag model, or if I use Conley’s OLS with standard
errors corrected for spatial dependence and cutoffs of 5 decimal degrees. I do not use
Conley’s estimator in the baseline because the dependent variable is ordinal. I cluster
standard errors by ethnographic region in the baseline, which adjusts for correlation in
the error terms within these largely contiguous regions.
Fourth, I use a strategy suggested by Wooldridge (2002). I de-mean all of the standard
controls and interact them with my ecological diversity measure. While some of these
interactions are significant, these heterogeneous treatments do little to diminish the
main result.
Fifth, I employ a nearest neighbor matching estimator in order to shift identifying
variation to those observations that are most observably similar.18 Because this requires
a binary “treatment,” I divide the sample into observations above and below median
ecological diversity. The difference in state centralization between “treated” and “un-
treated” societies (the average treatment effect) remains statistically significant and is
similar in magnitude to the comparable marginal effects in Table 2.
Sixth, I compute Altonji-Elder-Taber statistics. These do not support selection on the
unobservables.19
17In particular, I use the spatwmat and spatreg commands in Stata.
18In particular, I use the nnmatch command in Stata.
19Replicating the main regression using OLS, I obtain the estimated coefficient on ecological diversity βˆ1
and the estimated variance of the residuals Vˆ1. Regressing state centralization on the controls, I obtain
the predicted values xb and the estimated variance of the residuals Vˆ2. Regressing ecological diversity
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Finally, I use fixed effects. In successive columns, I control for ethnographic region,
United Nations region, country, and language family. These are estimated using OLS,
and they should be compared to the results in Table 4. I begin in column 10 with fixed
effects for each ethnographic region. This is equivalent to looking at variation within
ethnic clusters for identification. While regional dummies do reduce the magnitude of
the coefficient estimate, it remains significant. This fall in magnitude is not surprising;
in an OLS regression, the region dummies explain 19% of the variance in state central-
ization and 25% of the variance in ecological diversity.
In column 11 I add fixed effects for the United Nations’ division of Africa into South,
West, Central and East.20 The results remain significant. In column 12, I add country
fixed effects. I assign each ethnic group to the country into which the largest slice of its
territory falls. This removes biases due to the viewpoints of anthropologists from differ-
ent countries. In column 13, I add fixed effects for language family. These are unique
identifiers constructed from variables 98 and 99 in the Ethnographic Atlas. These divide
the sample into 20 groups such as “Niger-Congo: Eastern or Adamawa-Eastern”. The
results are again robust.
5. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
In this section, I give evidence that the Ricardian view of African states better fits
the data than six alternative interpretations of the link between ecological diversity and
state centralization. Some of these interpretations can be seen as complements, rather
than rivals, to the Ricardian view. The purpose of this section, then, is to show that they
do not fully account for the relationship between ecology and states.
5.1. Larger areas are more diverse and require more centralized administration. If
administering a larger area requires more levels of administration, states that happen
to cover greater territories for reasons unrelated to their strength may have more levels
of jurisdiction. Larger areas may be mechanically more diverse. Conversely, Spencer
(1998, 2010) argues that the delegation of administrative authority to regional units is a
ruler’s rational response to territorial expansion. These tendencies could link diversity
and states, independent of trade.
I have three strategies for dismissing this alternative. First, I restrict the sample to
societies of similar areas. In Table 5, I report the results if the smallest quintile (Q1),
largest quintile (Q5) or both are dropped. Results are robust to this sample restriction.
Second, I control for area directly in Table 5. This is not done in the main analysis,
because area is potentially endogenous. States that independently develop strong states
on xb, I obtain the coefficient estimate βˆ2. Altonji et al. (2005) suggest that if
βˆ1Vˆ2
βˆ2Vˆ1
> 1, it is unlikely that
unobservables will explain away the result of interest.
20I make the following assignments. Southern Africa: African Hunters, South African Bantu. Western
Africa: Guinea Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Moslem Sudan. Central Africa: Central Bantu,
Equatorial Bantu, Eastern Sudan. Eastern Africa: Northeast Bantu, Upper Nile, Ethiopia and Horn, Indian
Ocean.
14 JAMES FENSKE
might have larger areas. If, however, it is only through area that states become correlated
with ecological diversity, including it should eliminate the main result. It does not, and
neither does including the logarithm of area (not reported).
Third, I adopt the “virtual countries” approach of Michalopoulos (2011). I divide the
African continent into 1◦ by 1◦ squares and repeat the main analysis. I map these vir-
tual countries in the web appendix. Excepting coastal societies, the units of observation
are of a uniform shape and area.21 This exercise shows that, even conditioning on the
size of a territorial unit, diverse areas are more likely to host states. There are two addi-
tional benefits of this test. First, this approach mitigates the concern that multi-ethnic
states will be “double-counted.” Second, some readers may prefer “exogenous” units of
observation.
Because several ethnic groups might intersect a single square, I keep the levels of ju-
risdiction of the most centralized state as that square’s measure of state centralization;
that society’s crop type, date of observation, and ethnographic region are also kept for
the analysis. Results are presented in Table 5, and are robust to this approach.
5.2. States conquer trading regions. The second alternative explanation of the results
is that states emerge for reasons unrelated to the gains from trade, and then occupy
trading regions through migration or conquest. This interpretation could only be con-
clusively ruled out using panel data – data that do not exist. Lacking this, I use the cross
section to make three arguments. First, the artificial country results above suggest that
diversity does not result from the irregularly-shaped boundaries of ethnic groups that
have conquered their surroundings in ways that overlap with ecology. Second, if con-
quest requires that states expand, I have shown above that controlling for area does not
eliminate the main result.
Third, I give narrative evidence on some of the most statistically influential societies
in the data. This is, in effect, a very small panel taken from the larger cross section.
The eighteen most influential societies (by dfbeta) are listed in Table 7. The main argu-
ment of this paper is that trade causes states. If the centralized societies in this list are
known to have developed states where they are, rather than migrating to capture trad-
ing regions, this supports the Ricardian view. Further, if these states derived their wealth
and power from their location relative to geographically-determined trade routes, it is
evidence that trade was necessary for states to exist in these locations. I choose six cen-
tralized states for case study evidence.22
21Because the length of a degree of longitude varies by distance from the equator, I have also replicated
the results in Table 5 down-weighting observations by the degree of this distortion. The results (not re-
ported) are nearly identical.
22I choose these, rather than non-centralized societies, because the alternative story being discussed is
specific to centralized ethnic groups and because the secondary historical literature is richer for these
groups. These were the six most influential states when a different baseline specification was used in
earlier versions of this paper.
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It is possible that not all societies are able to take advantage of gains from trade in
order to become states. Groups that look different from their neighbors early on may
expand in response to new trading opportunities not seized by other societies around
them. This need not, on its own, imply rejection of the basic argument that this ex-
pansion was based on trade. What is critical is whether the society would have had the
resources to become a regional power in the absence of revenues and other benefits
coming from this trade.
To test the “Ricardian” view, I ask four questions about the Yoruba, Songhai, Toro,
Suku, Luba and Lozi. First, did these societies participate in trade? Second, was trade
a source of wealth for the society? Third, was trade a source of state power? Fourth,
did these states move to capture trading regions after they grew strong? I summarize
the answers to these questions in Table 7. Though I cannot claim that none of these
states conquered regions that possessed tradable resources, the two exceptions relied
on trade-related income in order to become powerful before expanding.
Yoruba. Morton-Williams (1969) argues that Yoruba Oyo “developed under the stim-
ulus of external trade,” benefiting at the beginning from its proximity to trade routes in
the north, and later from the growth of the coastal markets. Law (1977), similarly, links
the rise of Oyo to the strength of its imported cavalry, its participation in long-distance
commerce with the north, and its engagement in the Atlantic slave trade.
Trade was important to Oyo. Oyo cloth was sold to Dahomey and Porto Novo, and
the state imported kola nuts from the forest areas of Yorubaland for consumption and
re-export. Salt and camwood were imported, and the latter was re-exported to Nupe.
Horses for the Oyo cavalry were imported from the north. Law (1977) shows that the
Alafin (king) relied on trade taxes for revenue. Even direct taxes were collected in curren-
cies that were acquired through trade. Trade upheld the Alafin’s authority by permitting
him to maintain a superior standard of life and by enabling him to distribute money
and trade goods. He and other chiefs engaged in trade personally. Oyo depended on
trade across ecological zones for its existence, but gained resources for expansion by
participating in the slave trade. Neither Morton-Williams (1969) nor Law (1977) men-
tion conquest of neighboring regions as a pre-condition for trade.
Songhai. The Songhai Empire depended for its wealth on the trans-Saharan trade.
Neumark (1977) explains the success of Songhay but and the states that preceded it
using “their strategic commercial position on the fringes of the Sahara.” Songhay ex-
ported principally gold and slaves, as well as ivory, rhinoceros horns, ostrich feathers,
skins, ebony, civet, malaguetta pepper, and semi-precious stones. It re-exported cloth
and leather goods from Hausaland and kola from the forest zone. It imported salt, linen,
silk, cotton cloth, copper utensils and tools, ironwork, paper, books, weapons, cowries,
beads, mirrors, dates, figs, sugar, cattle and horses. This trade brought wealth; Leo
Africanus noted the empire’s prosperity (Levzion, 1975).
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Shillington (1989) cites taxes on trade as a source of government revenue. Lovejoy
(1978), similarly, points out Songhay’s most important cities “controlled trans-Saharan
trade, desert-side exchange, and river traffic on the Niger. Located in the Sahil but with
easy access to western and central savanna, they were at the hub of overland and river
routes where staples of desert-side trade such as grain and salt could readily be trans-
ferred from river boat to camel, and vice versa.”
Songhay did expand – Bovill (1995) writes that Songhay moved into the Hausa states
to capture their fertile land and into Air to drive out Tuareg raiders. This is not counter
to the Ricardian view. In the case of Air, this was a movement to protect existing trade
interests, not to secure new routes. The strength of Songhay, like the states that came
before it, had been based on its favorable location before it began its expansion.
Toro. One of Uganda’s four traditional kingdoms, economic production in Toro cen-
tered on finger-millet, plantains, sweet potatoes, beans, and cattle (Taylor, 1962). The
territory produced iron goods and salt for sale within the interlacustrine region (Ing-
ham, 1975). Ingham (1975) describes the Toro region as one of relative prosperity.
Trade was a source of state revenue, through both tribute and direct control. Taylor
(1962) states that the king, chiefs and lords of Toro maintained control over land, cattle,
lakes, salt lakes, medicinal springs, canoe services, and “certain commodities having
exchange or prestige value,” such as tusks and lion skins. They collected many of these
as tribute, and reallocated them to relatives, chiefs, officials and others. Subordinate
states introduced agents to collect tax from both salt producers and traders, a portion of
which was sent to Bunyoro (Ingham, 1975). The Toro kings sold slaves, ivory and cows
to Arab traders in return for guns and cloth (Taylor, 1962). Toro was also an exporter of
salt; Good (1972) notes that, until 1923, the okukama or Mukama (king) of Toro held
personal ownership over the trade in salt from Lake Katwe and other lake deposits near
Kasenyi. This was sold for regional consumption in Bunyoro, Rwanda and Tanzania,
and the Congo. (Good, 1972).
Toro did expand to take advantage of a tradable resource. Lake Katwe was in Bu-
songora, which had also seceded from Bunyoro, and which was an early conquest by
independent Toro (Good, 1972). Salt was, however, only one of many tradable goods
that enhanced the power of the Toro state.
Suku. The Suku of the Congolese savanna lacked a developed system of market places,
sold no cash crops and only limited rubber, and itinerant trade was “not at all devel-
oped” in the colonial era (Kopytoff, 1967). The Suku did participate as middlemen in the
long-distance trade between the raffia and palm-oil producers north and east of them
and southern groups who traded directly with the Portuguese (Kopytoff, 1967). They
purchased raw raffia for weaving into cloth, which was exported to the southeast along
with palm oil in return for shell money and European goods (Kopytoff, 1967). Though
relatively poor, the Suku were known for their wealth in shell money (Kopytoff, 1964).
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The Suku MeniKongo (king) directly ruled some twenty or thirty villages around the
capital and administered the remainder through regional chiefs. Shell money was legal
tender in rendering tribute to chiefs (Kopytoff, 1964), and so direct taxes were, indirectly,
taxes on trade.
The effect of trade on the Suku state was in part inherited from the impact of trade
on the political organization of the Lunda, from whom Suku seceded (Kopytoff, 1965).
Within the Lunda’s territory lay both copper mines and salt, which were sources of trade
and tribute (Birmingham, 1976). Slaves for export were collected through war and tribu-
tary tax collection, and this revenue allowed the royal court to distribute the trade goods
over which it held a near monopoly (Birmingham, 1976). The Suku inherited state forms
from their trading predecessor, and prospered from their position as middlemen.
Luba. Before they were unified, the separate Luba states controlled local dried fish,
salt, oil palm, raffia cloth, and copper-working industries (Birmingham, 1976). In the
late eighteenth century, Luba Lomami responded to the new long distance trade in ivory
and slaves, unifying the Luba (Birmingham, 1976). Bisa traders exchanged cloth, beads
and cattle for tusks that were sold subject to taxation and supervision by either the royal
household or by chiefs (Birmingham, 1976). This trade was preceded by “pioneering
chiefs,” who advanced into new lands and arranged for the purchase of ivory while at
the same time creating “a more or less permanent Luba political superstructure” behind
which the Bisa traders followed (Birmingham, 1976).
After 1780, the Luba expanded, first into the space between the Lualaba and Lake
Tanganyika, and later into the fishing and palm oil areas of the Lalaba lakes, the copper-
producing portions of the Samba, and the ivory-producing province of Manyema (Birm-
ingham, 1976). At its peak in the mid-nineteenth century, the empire presided over “a
wide-ranging and international trade” in oil, salt, poisons, drums, slaves, copper, palm
cloth, baskets, iron, skins and fish. Wilson (1972) argues that long-distance trade was
the cause of this expansion. The slave trade pushed the Luba to establish Kazembe as
a tributary kingdom. Birmingham (1976) argues that Luba decline followed that of the
ivory trade. Their trading partners turned to focus on copper. Swahili-Arab traders be-
gan to trade directly into the forest, cutting out the Luba. The Luba became unable to
purchase the guns needed to secure their power without exporting internally captured
slaves.
Lozi. The pastoral Lozi occupy the Zambezi floodplain (Gluckman, 1941). Within Lozi
territory, trade was in the specialized products of each region – bulrush millet and cas-
sava meal, wood products and iron were brought in from the bush (Gluckman, 1941).
Before 1850, the Lozi sent traders to the Lunda areas of the upper Zambezi, trading indi-
rectly with the Portuguese (Flint, 1970). By 1860, long distance trade, especially in ivory,
had become of major importance (Flint, 1970). The Lozi also exported cattle and forest
products in return for trade goods (Gluckman, 1941).
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The king and princess chief collected tribute in kind from the “tribes” under their
command, including canoes, weapons, iron tools, meat, fish, fruit, salt, honey, maize
and manioc (Birmingham, 1976). The Kololo, who ruled the Lozi between 1840 and
1864, obtained ivory as tribute from them and sold iron hoes to the Tonga. Trade strength-
ened the Kololo king. He established ‘caravan chiefs’ and kept profits from ivory within
his court (Flint, 1970). On re-gaining independence, the Lozi king traded cattle, ivory
and slaves for trade goods that he distributed (Gluckman, 1941).
Public goods. In return for the surplus states extracted from trade, subjects in each
of these states received greater peace and traders received protection. Taylor (1962,
p 60) writes that the Toro “expected patronage - protection, justice, undisturbed oc-
cupation of their land, and rewards especially in stock or chieftainships or honours for
good service.” Among the Lozi, the political authorities re-distributed tribute, some-
times to those in need, serving as what Gluckman (1941, p. 73) calls a “clearing house.”
Traders were willing to render gifts to the king, “for they traveled by his permission and
largely, despite their muskets, under his protection (p. 78).” Lewanika, for example, sent
a punitive expedition against subject Ila for having killed a party of traders (p. 79). Oyo
caravans, similarly, often traveled under cavalry protection (Law, 1975).
Summary. These cases are consistent with the Ricardian view that trade gives rise
to states. Songhai and Oyo expanded to capture more territory, but did so after having
arisen in locations favorable to trade. The Luba expanded after 1780 based on power
already acquired through the Bisa ivory trade. When that trade declined, the kingdom
collapsed. Lozi dominance over surrounding peoples depended on the ability to trade
and collect tribute in the diverse products of their neighbors. That the Suku participated
in long-distance trade while possessing only limited internal markets highlights the im-
portance trade in products of different macro-ecological regions. In every case, rulers
relied on taxing trade. Though Toro conquered Busongora to capture the most impor-
tant source of salt in the region, it inherited its political structure from Bunyoro, which
had previously grown strong due to its sale of metal goods and control of the Kibiro salt
industry.
5.3. Islands of quality. A third alternative interpretation is that states emerge to protect
“islands” of land quality that differ from neighboring areas. These will also have diverse
ecologies. In Table 5, I control for the range of agricultural constraints – the difference
in land quality between the best and worst points in a society’s territory. The effect of
diversity remains significant. If I control for a Theil index of agricultural constrains, the
results survive with almost no change in the coefficient (not reported).
5.4. Populationdensity. Fourth, it is possible that ecological diversity is correlated with
population density, which itself explains pre-colonial African states. No measures of
historic population are available in the Ethnographic Atlas. I can, however, proxy for
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historic population density by measuring it in 1960. This is published by the United Na-
tions Environment Programme.23 This is reported in Table 5, and the effect of ecological
diversity remains intact. This is also true if I include the log of (one plus) population
density (not reported). There is indeed a positive correlation between ecological di-
versity and population density, but once standard errors are clustered by ethnographic
region, this effect is no longer significant (not reported). I do not interpret the effect as
causal, since institutions may shape population. Rather, this exercise is only intended
to show that population cannot explain away the effect of ecological diversity on states.
5.5. Ethnic diversity. Fifth, it is possible that ecology-specific human capital gives rise
to a greater number of ethnic groups in regions of diverse ecology (Michalopoulos, 2011).
Following Tilly (1992), competition between these groups may lead them to develop
stronger states. Alternatively, more heterogeneous communities might form more so-
phisticated institutions in order to reduce conflict (Aghion et al., 2004). To show that
ethnic diversity is not driving my results, I return to my sample of artificial countries.
For each square, I count the number of ethnic groups that intersect it in Murdock’s map,
and include this as an additional control in Table 5. This does not do away with the
direct effect of ecological diversity on states in column 2, suggesting that this and the
gains-from-trade explanation of states are not mutually exclusive. The results are nearly
identical if I control instead for modern day heterogeneity. I measure this by counting
the languages reported within each artificial country in the World Language Mapping
System (not reported).24
This alternative interpretation of the results would also contradict several established
findings. Ethnic diversity increases the cost of nation-building (Alesina et al., 2005),
inhibits public goods provision (Easterly and Levine, 1997), and predicts the break-up
of nations (Desmet et al., 2009); there are good reasons to believe that ethnic diversity
should be a barrier to state centralization.25 Taking these results into account, the effect
that I find of ecological diversity is strong enough to overcome the state-dampening
effects of greater ethnic diversity, and any substitutability between trade openness and
nation-building (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (1997)).
5.6. Diversity and risk. It may also be that ecological diversity promotes state forma-
tion not through trade, but through increasing the number of activities a society may
rely on to cope with risk and seasonal variation. For transhumants, this means that an-
imals can be moved throughout the year to take advantage of seasonal food resources
and to avoid diseases (Beinart, 2007). I have already shown in section 4 that the results
23Raster data taken from http://na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php.
24The map can be purchased from http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/.
25Within artificial countries, the centralization of the median ethnic group is negatively related to the
number of ethnic groups (not reported). I have found no evidence that this relationship is non-
monotonic. The positive coefficient in column 2 likely comes from selecting the maximum from a larger
number of observations.
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are not driven by the presence of societies dependant on animal husbandry in the data.
Results are also robust to including the presence of bovines as a control (not reported).
To rule out the interpretation that ecological diversity works through the diversity of
subsistence activities, I create a Herfindahl index using the shares of income derived
from hunting, fishing, gathering, husbandry, and agriculture. These are computed us-
ing variables V 1 through V 5 of the Ethnographic Atlas. I show in Table 5 that this does
not change the results.
For agricultural societies, being able to cultivate a diverse set of grains may enable a
state to better cope with heterogeneity across space and with climatic risk (e.g. McCann
(1999) on Ethiopia). To the extent that these different grains serve as insurance through
intra-regional trade, this is not inconsistent with an interpretation linking diversity to
states through trade. I compute the share of each ethnic group’s territory that is most
suitable for each of the grains listed in plate 48 of the FAO-GAEZ data. I then construct
a Herfindahl index out of these shares as a measure of grain diversity. Including this
measure does not change the main result (not reported).
6. MECHANISMS
6.1. How does trade cause states? To illustrate the possible mechanisms connecting
trade to state centralization, I introduce a simple model in appendix A. This is based
loosely on Gennaioli and Voth (2011). In the model, a ruler extends his authority within
his ethnic group’s territory in order to tax trade. This trade cannot occur unless he offers
public goods that lower the costs of trade. These public goods could include dispute-
resolution services or physical protection. I do not specify whether these public goods
are used to facilitate trade with the citizens of neighboring states, or to promote internal
trade, since state services could lower trade costs in either case. I show that greater gains
from trade will lead the ruler to centrally administer a larger fraction of group’s territory.
In the model, there are three mechanisms by which trade may lead to states:
(1) Greater gains from trade will directly increase the profitability of state centraliza-
tion. It raises the tax base, allowing the ruler to extract greater revenues from the
territory he controls. Investment in public goods and administration becomes
worthwhile. Adding to this direct revenue effect, the ability of rulers to tax ex-
change and to trade on their own was highlighted by the case studies above.
(2) If greater access to trade makes it cheaper to project authority over space, cen-
tralization will increase. Access to trade can lower these costs. The ability to trade
for horses and for firearms made it easier for states such as Oyo and Songhai to
extend their power over space.
(3) If access to trade makes the ruler more effective at providing public goods, state
centralization becomes more profitable. Access to trade may give the ruler ac-
cess to goods that increase his authority in settling disputes and in demanding
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that traders not be harassed. The Alafin (king) of Oyo gained prestige by main-
taining a superior lifestyle, while the Lozi and Toro rulers secured loyalty by re-
distributing the profits from trade. Cavalry and firearms could be used to extend
protection to traders.
6.2. Tradeand intermediate outcomes. Here, I test whether trade predicts specific out-
comes related to state formation. I find that ecological diversity is strongly associated
with class stratification, but not with local political structures or with religion. Trade in
the SCCS is correlated with a wide selection of state functions, rather than a few narrow
indicators of state capacity.
Diminished local authority. The first possible mechanism is to take over the authority
of other smaller states in its vicinity. The atlas contains a variable (V32) that records the
number of “levels of local jurisdiction.” I take this as a crude measure of the strength of
local states, and use it as an outcome in place of state centralization in (1). While there is
a suggestive negative correlation between ecological diversity and local states when no
other controls are added, this is not robust to the inclusion of other variables. Similarly,
V72 records the rules for succession to the office of the local headman. I construct a
“headman is appointed” dummy if this rule is “appointment by higher authority.” In
Table 8, I show that there is no correlation in the data.
Islam. Islam diffused in Africa through trade networks that encouraged both tribal
unification and the adoption of Arabic (Insoll, 2003). This is one of the possible mech-
anisms linking trade to states. The data do not directly record Islam. They only state
whether high gods are “supportive of human morality.” This is only positive for a hand-
ful of societies outside of the Moslem Sudan, Western Sudan and Ethiopia, and so it is
effectively a dummy variable for either Christianity or Islam. This is only available for
a sample roughly half the size of the main sample, and does not appear to be related
to ecological diversity in Table 8. Similarly, if I include it as a control, the coefficient on
ecological diversity falls, but remains significant (not reported). Islam, then, does not
drive the correlation between trade and states in the data.
Class stratification. Trade allowed kings to amass wealth through taxation, letting
them gain prestige and control the flow of tribute. To test for this mechanism, I use V66,
“class stratification among freemen,” which is divided into five levels. In order, these are
“absence among freemen,” “wealth distinctions,” “elite,” “dual,” and “complex.” Eco-
logical diversity positively predicts this in Table 8. Results (not reported) are similar if a
binary class stratification measure is used. Though recent trade models argue that trade
increases inequality by raising incomes of abundant factors, increasing skill premia, and
through search frictions in import-competing sectors (Harrison et al., 2011), these are
of limited relevance to pre-industrial societies. Instead, rulers’ access to prestige goods,
trade goods, and tax revenues are more likely mechanisms.
Specific state functions. While the sample of African societies in the SCCS is too small
to use for comparing that source’s data on trade with the main sample here, I can test
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whether the various measures of state centralization in the SCCS’s global sample are
correlated with any of the forms of trade mentioned in that source. In the web appen-
dix, I report the significance of the estimated coefficient from a regression of the listed
measure of statehood on the listed measure of trade and a constant. Trade in food and
the importance of trade in subsistence are related with the greatest number of state
functions. The degree of police specialization (v90) and the level of the highest political
office (v1740) are correlated with all the trade measures. The degree to which the exec-
utive is concentrated in a single person (v85), the presence of a judiciary (based on v89)
and the level of highest overarching jurisdiction (v1741) are correlated with all but one.
Many types of trade, then, are related to several state-related outcomes in the SCCS – no
one type of trade operates through one specific mechanism.26
6.3. What sort of trade matters? Endowments of tradable products. The ecological di-
versity measure cannot capture all forms of trade. In Table 8, I test whether other sources
of trade – fishing, iron, gold, and salt – give similar rise to states. These data do not mea-
sure trade in these products, only the capacity to trade. Coefficients can be thought of
as intent-to-treat effects.
A society’s percentage dependance on fishing is V3 in the Ethnographic Atlas. I find no
correlation between this and states. To test the importance of minerals, I take data from
the US Geological Service’s Mineral Resources Program.27 These records contain data
on both metallic and nonmetallic mineral resources at specific sites. “Iron” is the num-
ber of sites of iron production found within an ethnic group’s territory, and “gold” is the
number of sites of gold production. If there is any bias from using modern data, it will be
positive, since modern states that have inherited the strength of their pre-colonial pre-
decessors should be better able to exploit their countries’ resources. Despite this, I find
no evidence that iron matters.28 Gold enters significantly when no controls are added,
though the effect of gold is marginally insignificant with controls. “Salt” is the number
26Other outcomes may be of interest to the reader. Ecological diversity does predict modern economic ac-
tivity, though not robustly. I use the same ln(1+Avg. light density) normalization of 2009 nighttime lights
as Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) to test this. The ecological diversity measure predicts condi-
tional, though not unconditional, differences in modern light densities. This effect disappears, however,
when standard errors are clustered by ethnographic region. Ecological diversity does predict area in an
OLS regression, and this is robust to both the standard controls and regional fixed effects (not reported).
I have found no relationship between ecological diversity and urbanization measured by cities in 1850
reported by Chandler and Fox (1974) (not reported).
Similarly, some readers may be interested in how ecological diversity and pre-colonial states relate to
colonial outcomes. I show in the web appendix that ethnic groups whose largest slice of territory was
conquered by Britain were generally more diverse and more centralized than those captured by France,
but less than those not colonized. Within the British empire, Frankema and van Waijenburg (2010) have
found early twentieth century real wages were much higher in West Africa than East Africa. If there is
any pattern apparent, it is that ethnic groups in Britain’s East African conquests were more diverse and
centralized than those in Ghana and Nigeria, though Sierra Leone is an exception.
27The data are available at http://mrdata.usgs.gov/
28I similarly find no result if I use the number of iron-producing sites within a group’s territory listed by
Sundstro¨m (1974) as a measure of iron.
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of salt-producing cites listed by Sundstro¨m (1974) within an ethnic group’s territory.29
This too appears irrelevant.
Types of trade. I also test whether state centralization is correlated with any particular
form of trade in the SCCS’s global sample. In the web appendix, I present the correla-
tions between these indicators and state centralization. Societies with states are more
likely to trade for food, through more levels of intermediation, and this trade is more
important to their subsistence. Political power is more likely to depend on commerce
in more centralized states, trade and markets are more likely to exist, and exchange is
more important both within the community. Interestingly, this suggests that it is more
mundane, intra-community trade in products such as food, rather than long distance
trade in products such as gold and ivory, that matters for the formation of states.
Local and long distance trade. Despite this suggestive finding, the main data sources
here do not allow for these two types of trade to be conclusively tested against each
other. I show in Table 8 that the presence of historical trade routes is correlated with
state centralization.30 This does not, however, rule out the importance of local trade.
Similarly, while “ecological diversity” is intended as a proxy for intra-ethnic trade and
“distance from an ecological boundary” is meant to capture long distance trade, I show
in the web appendix that including both in the same regression does not allow their
effects to be disentangled. They are strongly correlated, and both coefficients fall rela-
tively 40% relative to their values in Tables 2 and 3.
6.4. Is Africa different? I have focused my analysis on sub-Saharan Africa, because
Bates (1983) drew on the historiography of this region when formulating his view. There
is, however, no reason that ecologically-driven gains from trade need only lead to states
in Africa. Theories of state formation that attempt to explain Europe and Asia are often
similar to the Ricardian view. Jones (2003), for example, argues that:
In Europe’s case, the most relevant aspect of the resource endowment was
probably the way it was dispersed across a geologically and climatically
varied continent, since this provided an inducement to trade (p. xxxii).
In other work, I have assembled an analogous geographic set of data for all 1,267 so-
cieties of the Ethnographic Atlas.31 While some of the controls used here are either not
available outside of Africa or computed somewhat differently in that data, I am able to
expand the present analysis to the whole world. Results in Table 9 suggest that Africa
is not different: in a sample of more than 1,000 societies from around the world, eco-
logical diversity continues to predict the existence of states. This is true even as the
sub-Saharan societies are dropped from the analysis, and coefficient magnitudes re-
main similar.
29Of 271 sites he lists, I match 84 to ethnic groups in the data and 157 to specific geographic locations, such
as Cape Lopez. For 30 I could not find a match. The full table of matches is given in the Web Appendix.
30The presence of historical trade routes is taken from Michalopoulos et al. (2010).
31This has been created for Fenske (2011b). Details are given in the web appendix for that paper.
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7. CONCLUSION
I have used this paper to provide empirical support for Bates’s (1983) Ricardian view
of pre-colonial African states. The gains from trade stemming from ecological diversity
predict the presence of state centralization across sub-Saharan societies recorded in the
Ethnographic Atlas. Moving from a homogenous zone to one that is ecologically diverse
predicts that the chance a society is centralized rises by more than 10 percentage points.
There is no evidence that the effect is overstated due to endogeneity, or is due to the in-
fluence outliers or specific ethnographic regions. The histories of African societies are
consistent with this interpretation of the data, rather than one in which states emerge
and then migrate. Similarly, area, defense of fertile islands, correlation with dense pop-
ulation, risk mitigation, and ethnic competition do not explain away the results.
What does this result add to our understanding of the link between institutions and
development in the present? First, it suggests that other findings that have been inter-
preted as effects of culture may operate through institutions. For example, the result in
Durante (2009) that historical experience with mutual insurance leads to greater levels
of trust may arise through the institutional consequences of mutually-insuring trade.
Second, institutions have heterogeneous effects on development, and part of this het-
erogeneity is both path-dependent and context-specific. The mechanisms that shaped
pre-colonial states in Africa will continue to shape development in the present over and
above the influence that the remnants of these polities have today. The legacy of states
is, in part, the outcome of a history of ecologically-driven trade.
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APPENDIX A. MODEL
An ethnic group exists on a unit interval, stretching from 0 to 1. The natural ruler of
the ethnic group lives at point 0. He chooses S ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of the ethnic group’s
territory to bring under his direct jurisdiction. That is, he will choose the level of state
centralization. He will do this in order to tax the inhabitants in their trading activities.
I will show that greater gains from trade will lead him to centralize a larger fraction of
group’s territory.
The territory is inhabited by a continuum of agents of mass 1. They are spread uni-
formly over the interval. Each of these agents chooses between one of two activities:
farming and trading. The returns from farming are normalized to 1. Farming cannot be
taxed. Trading, if successful, gives a return of θ > 1. Trading can be taxed, and so an
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agent who lives within the centralized state pays a tax rate of τ ∈ [0, 1] on trade income.
τ is chosen by the ruler. Agents who live outside the state pay no tax.
In addition to being taxable, trading is also costly. If the agent chooses trading, it en-
tails a cost of q. This could represent, for example, the cost of avoiding theft or resolving
disputes. The net income from trade is, then, (1− τ)θ − q. Agents will engage in trade if
(1− τ)θ − q ≥ 1.
As the ruler expands the size of the state, he provides public goods to his subjects
that lower q. These could include dispute-resolution services or physical protection. In
particular, if the ruler spends p units of revenue per unit of territory on public goods, the
cost of trade is q = 1
γp
. Here, γ is a parameter that captures the effectiveness of public
goods. Agents outside the state receive no public goods. For them, q is infinite, and no
trade is possible.
The ruler is self-interested, and maximizes his net revenues. If he brings a piece of
territory under his jurisdiction, he will ensure that p and τ are set such that all of the
subjects choose trade, rather than agriculture. Otherwise, he cannot collect any taxes
from them. He must select p and τ such that (1−τ)θ−q ≥ 1. In addition to expenditures
on public goods, pS, the ruler must pay a cost to extend his authority over space. This
takes the form cS2. c > 0 is a parameter that captures the costs of projecting power. If
the ruler controls a territory of length S, and all of the inhabitants engage in trade rather
than agriculture, his net revenue will be (θτ − p)S− cS2. Given a state of size S, the ruler
maximizes:
V R(S) = max
τ,p
(θτ − p)S − cS2(5)
s.t.(1− τ)θ − 1
γp
≥ 1(6)
Because net revenue is obviously increasing in τ and decreasing in p, the constraint
in (6) will bind. The ruler will be compelled to choose τ and p such that τ = 1 − 1+γp
θγp
.
When this is substituted into (5), the ruler’s problem can be solved from its first order
conditions. At an interior solution, these give the ruler’s optimal p and τ :
p∗ =
√
1
γ
τ ∗ =
θ − 1
θ
− 1
θ
√
γ
If θτ ∗ ≤ p∗, then γ and θ are such that no territory can be administered profitably. For
a given S, the ruler will choose to set τ = p = 0 in order to minimize his losses. The
ruler’s net revenue, conditional on S, can now be written as:
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V R(S) = max
{(
θ − 2
√
1
γ
− 1
)
S − cS2,−cS2
}
If the ruler maximizes this with respect to S, the degree of state centralization that
maximizes the ruler’s self interest is:
S∗ = min
{
1,max
{
1
2c
(
θ − 2
√
1
γ
− 1
)
, 0
}}
(7)
Define θL as the value of θ that solves θτ ∗ = p∗. This is the minimum θ for which
any state centralization is profitable. Below this threshold, the ruler does not bring any
of the ethnic group’s territory under his control. Similarly, define θH as the level of θ
for which S∗ = 1. For this level of θ and above, the ruler centralizes the entire terri-
tory. If θ ∈ (θL, θH), three results hold that highlight mechanisms by which ecologically-
determined gains from trade spurred state centralization in pre-colonial Africa. These
are not mutually exclusive:
(1) ∂S
∗
∂θ
> 0. Greater gains from trade will directly increase the profitability of state
centralization.
(2) ∂S
∗
∂c
< 0. If greater access to trade makes it cheaper to project authority over
space, centralization will increase.
(3) ∂S
∗
∂γ
> 0. If access to trade makes the ruler more effective at providing public
goods, state centralization becomes more profitable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean s.d. Min Max N
State centralization 1.15 0.93 0 4 440
Any centralization 0.73 0.44 0 1 440
Local state 2.91 0.68 2 4 439
Class stratification 1.25 1.41 0 4 364
Headman appointed 0.066 0.25 0 1 320
Light density 1.50 0.18 1.15 3.34 440
Ecological diversity 0.30 0.23 0 0.80 440
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.47 0.23 0 0.80 440
Ecological polarization 0.51 0.38 0 1.00 440
Dist. ecological boundary 0.45 0.53 0.019 2.95 440
Any diversity 0.78 0.42 0 1 440
Salt 0.42 0.88 0 6 440
Gold production 0.34 1.86 0 24 440
Iron production 0.12 0.33 0 1 440
% dep. on fishing 8.32 10.9 0 70 440
Major river 0.23 0.42 0 1 440
Ag. constraints 5.41 1.06 2.94 8.92 440
Dist. coast 5.54 3.76 0 14.9 440
Elevation 728 520 -7.41 2,308 440
Malaria 0.83 0.27 0 1 440
Precipitation 846 468 0 2,474 440
Ruggedness 71,792 70,413 0 421,381 440
Temperature 8,882 1,112 5,295 10,699 440
Dist. L. Victoria 2,198 1,438 131 5,708 440
Date observed 1,919 21.6 1,830 1,960 440
Dist. Atlantic ST 6,688 1,515 3,671 9,949 440
Dist. Indian ST 4,546 1,589 1,028 7,953 440
Dist. Saharan ST 3,333 975 806 6,999 440
Dist. Red ST 2,887 1,360 107 5,773 440
Crop: None 0.025 0.16 0 1 440
Crop: Trees 0.084 0.28 0 1 440
Crop: Roots/tubers 0.19 0.39 0 1 440
Log rainfall range 5.18 1.01 1.39 7.42 370
Area 2.43 3.64 8.2e-06 27.0 440
Pop. density 22.2 28.5 0 311 440
Ag. constraints range 4.66 1.95 0 9 440
Subsistence diversity 0.52 0.12 0.13 0.74 440
Other variables used
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Outcomes
Gains from trade
Controls
Ecological diversity
Other controls
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Continuous Above median Continuous Above median
0 levels -0.259*** -0.108*** -0.225*** -0.090***
(0.087) (0.033) (0.070) (0.025)
1 level -0.022 -0.009 -0.024 -0.010
(0.038) (0.016) (0.030) (0.012)
2 levels 0.152*** 0.063*** 0.152*** 0.061***
(0.052) (0.019) (0.051) (0.018)
3 levels 0.118*** 0.050*** 0.093*** 0.038***
(0.044) (0.018) (0.035) (0.013)
4 levels 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Table 2. Ecological diversity predicts states
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation,
malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major
slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise specified. Coefficient estimates where ecological
diversity is replaced with an "above median" indicator are not reported.
Marginal effects
0.794***
(0.266)
No
440
Yes
440
0.0111 0.070
0.719***
(0.239)
(1) (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any cent. Cent. > 1
Ecological diversity 0.272** 0.271***
(0.126) (0.096)
Dist. ecological boundary -0.303***
(0.069)
Ecological polarization 0.370***
(0.132)
Any diversity 0.355**
(0.145)
Ecological diversity (Simpler classes) 0.806**
(0.316)
Ecological diversity (High density areas) 0.643***
(0.210)
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.996***
(0.281)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, except with "any centralization" as the outcome, in which case probit is used with
marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation,
ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise specified. 
Table 3. The main result holds with alternative measures of states and diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ecological diversity 0.559*** 0.606*** 2.676*** 3.840***
(0.167) (0.188) (0.949) (1.472)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 370 440 370
F-statistic 66.80 16.17
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Log rainfall range 0.090*** 0.185** 0.034*** 0.048***
(0.029) (0.076) (0.004) (0.011)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 370 440 370
IV
OLS: First Stage
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region.
Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation,
malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance
from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise
specified. The excluded instrument is the log rainfall range. In columns 3, 5, and 7,
missing values of the log rainfall range are recoded to zero. In columns 2, 4, 6, and 8,
these observations are excluded. 
Table 4. The main result is robust to reverse causation
Ecological diversity
OLS: Reduced form
OLS: Baseline
State centralization
State centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Including 
area shares
Latitude 
longitude 
cubic
 Spatially 
correlated 
errors  Spatial lag Conley's OLS
 Including 
neighbors' X
Interactions 
with de-
meaned 
controls
Ecological diversity 0.981*** 0.673*** 0.508** 0.532*** 0.559*** 0.583*** 0.748***
(0.284) (0.212) (0.216) (0.200) (.199) (0.200) (0.259)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Wald test (λ=0) 1.221
Wald test (ρ=0) 4.428
WX p 0
Moran p 0.273
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Nearest 
neighbor 
matching
Altonji-
Elder-Taber 
Statistic
Ethno. 
region F.E.
UN region 
F.E. Country F.E.
Lang. family 
F.E.
Ecological diversity 0.336* 0.521** 0.325* 0.347**
(0.170) (0.183) (0.164) (0.140)
Above Median Diversity SATE 0.265***
(0.100)
Altonji-Elder-Taber Statistic 4.77
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 437
Table 5. The main result is robust to unobserved heterogeneity
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, excepting the spatial estimators as noted in the
text, and columns (10) through (13), which are OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region, excepting spatial estimators as noted in
the text. Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature,
distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise specified. 
State centralization
State centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Artificial 
countries
Artificial 
countries Drop Area Q1 Drop Area Q5 
Drop Area Q1 and 
Q5
Ecological diversity 0.450*** 0.418*** 0.890*** 0.671** 0.982***
(0.114) (0.120) (0.274) (0.264) (0.288)
No. of Ethnic Groups 0.105***
(0.039)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1523 1523 440 440 440
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Ecological diversity 0.686*** 0.548** 0.697*** 0.731***
(0.233) (0.259) (0.234) (0.240)
Area 0.019
(0.023)
Ag. Constraints Range 0.065*
(0.036)
Pop. density 0.001
(0.002)
Subsistence diversity -0.328
(0.557)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation,
ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless
otherwise specified. 
Table 6. The Ricardian interpretation better explains the main result than six alternatives
State centralization
State centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Name Cent. dfbeta Name Cent. dfbeta
Songhai 3 0.18 Luba 3 0.11
Yoruba 3 0.18 Kunama 0 0.11
Chiga 0 0.16 Rundi 3 0.09
Laketonga 0 0.15 Fur 3 0.09
Bagirmi 3 0.15 Akyem 2 0.09
Lozi 3 0.15 Tigon 0 0.09
Toro 3 0.15 Lokele 0 0.08
Barea 0 0.12 Bombesa 0 0.08
Shuwa 2 0.12 Suku 3 0.08
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 Yoruba  Songhai  Toro  Suku  Luba  Lozi
Participated in trade?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trade a source of wealth?  Yes  Yes  Yes Unclear  Yes  Yes
Trade a source of state power?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
No capture of trading regions?  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
These summarize the results of the case studies described in the text.
Table 7. The Ricardian interpretation is consistent with the histories of six influential states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local state
Class 
Stratification
Headman is 
appointed High gods Light density
Ecological diversity -0.200 1.514*** 0.035 -0.029 0.084
(0.249) (0.221) (0.136) (0.884) (0.090)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 439 364 320 242 440
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
% dep. on fishing 0.003
(0.004)
Iron production 0.041
(0.164)
Gold production 0.020
(0.016)
Salt 0.032
(0.055)
Hist. trade route 0.526***
(0.158)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, except column
(5), which is OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are major river, agricultural
constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake
Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise specified. 
Table 8. Trade supports class stratification, and no one type of trade matters most
Ecological diversity (FAO)
Other controls
Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors
in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are land quality, distance from coast,
elevation, malaria, rainfall, temperature, date, crop dummies, major river, ruggedness and
absolute latitude.
State centralization
1,077 637
0.913***
Table 9. The main result holds outside of Africa
(0.199)
Yes
0.713***
(0.236)
Yes
(1)
Whole world
(2)
 Excluding sub-Saharan 
Africa
